Barracuda spots 7 million device code phishing attacks
What happened
Barracuda reported 7 million device‑code phishing attacks in four weeks and tied the surge to the EvilTokens phishing kit. The attacks specifically exploit device‑code OAuth flows to obtain access and refresh tokens for Microsoft 365/Entra ID, making the risk operational for any buyer using those flows on shared or limited‑interface devices. Watch whether this technique spreads to other identity providers and whether vendors publish revocation/mitigation steps
Buyer takeaway
This is a clear, operational exploit of OAuth device flows; buyers must identify affected integrations and require supplier support for token controls and incident response
Cost / money
Directional cost pressure: adding token revocation, logging, and emergency support to supplier scopes can increase integration or managed‑service fees
Supplier / commercial
Suppliers that already offer session visibility or token management can command better positioning; procurement should request feature commitment windows rather than accept vague roadmaps
Safety / operations
Operationally real: attackers exchange legitimate device codes for tokens, bypassing password theft; incident response needs token revocation and forensic visibility to contain compromise
What to watch
Limited evidence about cross‑provider spread yet, but buyers should monitor other identity providers and ask suppliers for mitigation timelines
Key facts
- 7 million device‑code phishing attacks observed in a four‑week window
- Exploits target OAuth device‑code flows for Microsoft 365 and Entra ID
Source excerpts
Device code authentication is commonly used when someone needs to sign in on one device by entering a short code on another trusted device
Device code authentication is commonly used when someone needs to sign in on one device by entering a short code on another trusted device. It is often used on devices with limited interfaces, including televisions, printers and command-line tools
Attackers exploit that familiarity by requesting a legitimate device code from Microsoft, then sending a phishing message urging the target to enter the code on an official sign-in page. If the victim completes the process, Microsoft issues OAuth access and refresh tokens, which are then passed to the attacker
