Europe built sovereign clouds to escape US control. Then forgot about the processors
What happened
Researchers and analysts flagged that most European 'sovereign' cloud operators still run on Intel and AMD processors whose embedded management engines (ME/PSP) operate below the OS and hypervisor. These management engines have independent network stacks and privileges that European certification frameworks cannot fully attest, creating a hardware layer buyers cannot audit by standard means. Watch for supplier attestations, firmware disclosure, or contract language changes that either accept this residual risk or require tangible remediation
Buyer takeaway
Treat hardware provenance and firmware as a contractual and technical requirement for sovereign cloud buys, not just a compliance checkbox
Cost / money
Mitigating hardware‑level exposure often requires additional validation, firmware attestations, or hardware replacement — all of which increase total cost of ownership or delay onboarding
Supplier / commercial
Vendors will resist warranty cover for Ring‑3 risks; expect negotiation on liability caps, disclosure limits, and the operational scope of 'sovereignty' promises
Safety / operations
Undetectable management engine channels can enable persistent exfiltration or remote control that standard host security won't see, increasing operational risk for hosted workloads
What to watch
Limited supplier transparency and the technical difficulty of auditing ME/PSP mean buyers should demand evidence or alternative hardware paths; if suppliers refuse, re‑price or re‑source
Key facts
- EU investing in sovereign cloud initiatives with multi‑billion euro programs
- Management engines (Intel ME / AMD PSP) operate at Ring -3 below OS controls
- Researchers demonstrated software‑only attacks against confidential compute (example: Fabrick
Source excerpts
Both Intel and AMD processors contain management engines that operate below the operating system
Users recognize the symptom: a laptop powered off and stored for weeks is found, on next boot, to have a depleted battery
"Saying it is useless to do SecNumCloud because there is ME, or whatever backdoor in some hardware we don't control, is a mistake," he says. SecNumCloud improves security over deployments without such controls, he argues, provided that hardware is carefully evaluated and firmware securely configured
